In the companion paper (Ben Yaghlane, Smets, & Mellouli, 2000a) , we have enhanced the distinction between non-interactivity and doxastic independence in the context of the transferable belief model. The first corresponds to decompositionality of the belief function, whereas the second is defined as irrelevance preserved under Dempster's rule of combination. We had shown that the two concepts are equivalent in the marginal case. We proceed here with the conditional case. We show how the definitions generalize themselves, and that we still have the equivalence between conditional non-interactivity and conditional doxastic independence.
Introduction
In many fields of Artificial Intelligence, the notion of conditional independence is considered as very important. Among others, it permits to simplify several computational reasoning tasks. Indeed, instead of having to explore a complete knowledge base of a given complex problem, we organize the problem into simpler components in such a way that we only manipulate the pieces of information having relevance to the question we are interested in.
The concept of probabilistic conditional independence was initially developed by Dawid (Dawid, 1979) . More recently and in order to enhance the application of Probability Theory to Artificial Intelligence, Pearl and Paz suggested the connections between conditional independence and graphical representations and proved that the essence of conditional independence can be identified with a common structure consisting of some basic properties of the conditional independence relation, called 'graphoid axioms' (Pearl & Paz, 1987) . These axioms convey the simple idea that when we learn an irrelevant fact, the relevance relationships of all other propositions remain unchanged (Pearl, 1988) .
The graphoid axioms are also satisfied by embedded multi-valued dependency models in relational databases (Fagin, 1977) , by conditional independence in Spohn's theory of ordinal conditional functions (Spohn, 1988) , (Hunter, 1991) , by qualitative conditional independence in Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions partitions (Shafer, Shenoy, & Mellouli, 1987) , by possibilistic conditional independence (Fonck, 1994) , (de Campos, Huete, & Moral, 1995) , (Vejnarova, 1999) , by conditional independence and irrelevance in connection to the theory of closed convex sets of probability measures (Cozman, 1999) , and by conditional independence in valuation-based systems (VBS) representing many different uncertainty calculi (Shenoy, 1994) .
Unfortunately, these axioms have not received a complete treatment in the literature when related to the theory of belief functions. For this purpose, we study the notion of independence between sets of variables when uncertainty is expressed by belief functions as defined in the context of the transferable belief model (TBM) (Smets & Kennes, 1994) , (Smets, 1998) . This study is done in two parts: marginal independence and conditional independence.
In the first part (Ben Yaghlane et al., 2000a) , we have discussed different concepts of marginal independence for belief functions and we have clarified the relationships between the concepts of non-interactivity, irrelevance and doxastic independence. Non-interactivity is defined by the 'mathematical' property useful for computation considerations and it means that the joint belief function can be reconstructed from its marginals. Irrelevance is defined by a 'common sense' property based on conditioning, and it means that conditioning the joint belief function on one variable and marginalizing it on the other variable produce a belief function that is the same whatever the conditioning event. Doxastic independence is defined by a particular form of irrelevance, the one preserved under Dempster's rule of combination. The main results of this study is that we have proved that irrelevance alone does not imply non-interactivity. We have also proved that doxastic independence is equivalent to non-interactivity, thus equating the 'common sense' definition with the 'mathematical' one.
In this second part, we extend these concepts of marginal independence for belief functions to conditional case. We particularly discuss the new properties and we show that we still have the equivalence between conditional noninteractivity and conditional doxastic independence. Finally, we present the axiomatic characterization of conditional independence definition for belief functions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we first introduce the necessary notations and terminologies. In section 3, we recall the definition of probabilistic conditional independence. Then, after extending the definition of evidential and cognitive independence to the conditional case (section 4), we present our definitions of conditional non-interactivity (section 5), conditional irrelevance (section 6) and conditional doxastic independence (section 7) for belief functions. In section 8, we discuss the axiomatic characterization of conditional independence definition for belief functions. Finally, in section 9, we summarize the results achieved in this paper and point out some future directions.
Notations and Terminologies
The main purpose of the theory of belief functions, also known as DempsterShafer theory and theory of evidence, is to model someone's degree of belief. Since it was developed by Shafer (Shafer, 1976) , many interpretations have been proposed. Among them, we can distinguish: the lower probability model (Jaffray, 1989) , (Walley, 1991) , Dempster's model (Dempster, 1967) , the hint model (Kohlas & Monney, 1995) and the transferable belief model (TBM) (Smets & Kennes, 1994) . Like in our companion paper (Ben Yaghlane et al., 2000a) , we are only concerned, in this paper, with the TBM.
Most needed definitions and properties have been given in the first part of this paper and the reader is referred to it to find the conventions and the background material on belief functions and the transferable belief model. In this section, we just reproduce the important ones in order to help the reader.
Sets
When authors discuss about conditional independence, they begin with a set S of variables X 1 , X 2 ...X n , then consider pairwise disjoint subsets of variables U, V, W where U ⊆ S, V ⊆ S and W ⊆ S. The concepts of non-interactivity, irrelevance and independence are then defined between U , V and W . We will not repeat systematically this preliminary definitions, and we will consider only three variables, denoted X, Y, Z, with the understanding that each one represents a variable which domain is the product space of its related X i variables.
Set Notations
We give here some essential set notations.
• By convention, indexed variables like x i , y j , z k denote elements of their domain whereas x, y, z denote subsets of their domain.
• If X, Y, Z are three variables, XY denotes X × Y and XY Z denotes X × Y × Z.
•
• For
• For x ⊆ X, x ↑XY is the cylindrical extension of x on XY :
• For w ⊆ Ω, w ↓X is the projection of w on X:
• For any w ⊆ XY Z, we have w = ∪ zi∈Z (A i , z i ) where A i ⊆ XY . Note that A i may be empty for some i. Equivalently, we have w = ∪ zi∈w ↓Z (A i , z i ) in which case A i = ∅ for all i.
• Let A ⊆ XZ and B ⊆ Y Z, with
• We assume that the variables X, Y, Z are 'independent', by what we mean that:
All these definitions are extended to the case where indices are permuted.
Properties of the Intersections
In order to avoid any confusion on the domain of the sets, we often indicate it in the first superscript of each set. So A XZ means that A ⊆ XZ. The arrows then indicate the extensions and marginalizations to which they are submitted.
Proof. Direct from lemma 2.1 when |Y | = 1 and B is replaced by z and noting that marginalization does not affect the emptiness status. ✷
Proof. We have:
The Z-layered Rectangles
When studying non-interactivity in a two dimension space, we have introduced the notion of a 'rectangle' as follows.
Definition 2.1 Rectangles. A rectangle in XY is a subset of XY that admits a representation as
This notion was useful as in case of non-interactivity under m, all focal elements of m are rectangles. This notion can be generalized into a concept of 'Z-layered rectangles'. A Z-layered rectangle is a subset w of XY Z such that for every z i ∈ Z, its intersection with z ↑XY Z i is a rectangle in XY . Formally, a definition of Z-layered rectangles is as follows. Figure 1 presents an example of Z-layered rectangle. We define ZLR as the set of Z-layered rectangles.
Definition 2.2 Z-layered rectangles.
A set w ⊆ XY Z is called a Z-layered rectangle if, for every z i ∈ Z, (w ∩ z ↑XY Z i ) ↓XY is a rectangle in XY . Lemma 2.4 A set w ⊆ XY Z is a Z-layered rectangle iff it admits the repre- sentation w = ∪ zi∈Z (x w i , y w i , z i ) where x w i ⊆ X, y w i ⊆ Y Proof. By definition 2.2, (w ∩ z ↑XY Z i ) ↓XY is a rectangle in XY , thus it can be represented as (x w i , y w i ), hence the lemma. ✷ ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ z1 ✉ ✉ ✉ ✉ ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ x1 ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ x2 ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ x3 ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ y1 ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ y2 ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ y3 ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ z2 ✉ ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ x1 ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ x2 ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ x3 ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ y1 ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ y2 ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ y3 ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ z3 ✉ ✉ ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ x1 ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ x2 ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ x3 ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ ✟ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ y1 ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ y2 ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ y3 ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍
Definition 2.3 ZLR
In the marginal case, we have shown that the focal elements of m are rectangles in XY when X and Y are non-interactive under m (Theorem 3 in (Ben Yaghlane et al., 2000a) ). For the conditional case, we show below that the focal elements of m will be Z-layered rectangles when X and Y are non-interactive given Z under m.
Belief Functions

Notations
• We use the notation m Ω [x] to represent the bba (shorthand for basic belief assignment) m defined on the domain Ω given the belief holder knows (accepts) that x is true (i.e. x holds). The term m can be replaced by bel, pl, q in order to denote the belief function , the plausibility function and the commonality function. The values taken by these functions at w ⊆ Ω are denoted by m
is called a basic belief mass (bbm).
• In the TBM, none of these functions is necessarily normalized. When we want to get the normalized forms, we use the upper-cases notations M, Bel, P l, Q. These normalized functions are obtained by dividing the unnormalized functions by the factor 1 -m(∅) (putting M (∅) = 0, Bel(∅) = 0 and Q(∅) = 1).
• The ⊕ symbol represents Dempster's rule of combination in its normalized form and ∩ represents the conjunctive combination, i.e., the same operation as Dempster's rule of combination except the normalization (the division by 1 − m(∅)) is not performed. The conjunctive combination rule can be written equivalently as:
w1,w2⊆Ω,w1∩w2=w
The next formula is very useful:
where f ∈ {m, bel, pl, q} and f 1 [w * ] is the result of the unnormalized conditioning of f 1 on w * ⊆ Ω (see (Smets, 1993) ).
• pl 1 ∩ pl 2 represents the plausibility function obtained from m 1 ∩ m 2 where m 1 and m 2 are the bba's related to pl 1 and pl 2 , respectively (and similarly with bel and q).
• The set of belief functions defined on Ω is denoted by BF Ω .
• By abuse of language, we may omit the Ω index and we will write statements like m ∈ BF Ω to mean that the belief function associated with m belongs to BF Ω .
• When convenient, bba's m on Ω are represented by the list of pairs (w, x) where w is a focal element of m (a subset of Ω with a non null bbm), and x = m(w). So ((w 1 , .4), (w 2 , .6)) represents the bba m Ω on Ω with m Ω (w 1 ) = .4 and m Ω (w 2 ) = .6, and w 1 ⊆ Ω and w 2 ⊆ Ω.
Marginalization of Belief Functions
We present some of the relations described by Shenoy (Shenoy, 1994) concerning marginalization and used in this paper. Their labels are those of Shenoy. (m
Proof. See Shenoy (Shenoy, 1994) , page 210. ✷
Probabilistic Conditional Independence
First, we present the meaning of the conditional independence concept in the probability theory. Suppose three variables X, Y and Z, and let the space Ω = XY Z. Let P be a distribution on XY Z. We write X ⊥ ⊥ P Y |Z to denote that, X and Y are conditionally independent given Z, with respect to P . The usual definition of X ⊥ ⊥ P Y |Z is in terms of the factorization of the conditional joint probability distribution on XY given Z. We say that X and Y are conditionally independent given Z, with respect to P XY Z , if and only if
where
There is another equivalent definition, which is more intuitive, that is: X and Y are conditionally independent given Z, with respect to P XY Z , if and only
↓X is the conditional probability of P XY Z on X given y and z i .
Like the marginal probabilistic case, this second definition can be interpreted as conditional irrelevance and it means that once the value of Z is specified, any further information about Y is irrelevant to the uncertainty about X.
As far as the two definitions turn out to be equivalent, the distinction between the factorization and the irrelevance probabilistic approach is not essential, and often it is not even considered.
Evidential and Cognitive Independence
In the marginal case (Ben Yaghlane et al., 2000a) , we have presented the notions of evidential independence and cognitive independence for belief functions. These notions have been first introduced by Shafer (Shafer, 1976) for the marginal case. In addition, it is shown in Shafer (Shafer, 1976 ) that evidential independence implies cognitive independence, but not the reverse. In this section, we only consider evidential independence.
In the multivariate framework, Kong (Kong, 1988) 
When Z is not specified this becomes marginal evidential independence of X and Y (Definition 3 in (Ben Yaghlane et al., 2000a) ).
Almond ((Almond, 1995) , page 114) calls this independence a strong conditional independence and shows it is equivalent to: Definition 4.2 Strong Conditional Independence. Let X,Y and Z be three variables. X and Y are (strongly) 
This definition turns out to be equivalent to what we call hereafter conditional non-interactivity. In the following sections, we present our definition of conditional non-interactivity, conditional irrelevance and conditional doxastic independence.
Conditional Non-Interactivity
Preamble. Many proofs are highly simplified when a matricial notation is used. This notation being unusual, we do not use it in the core of the paper, but we relegate it in the appendix A. The proofs using such notations are therefore also put in the appendix A.
Definition of Conditional Non-interactivity
We focus now on the decompositional independence definition for belief functions. This definition is represented by the non-interactivity that is a mathematical property useful for calculus considerations. For the full study of the marginal non-interactivity concept for belief functions, the reader can be referred to (Ben Yaghlane, Smets, & Mellouli, 2000b) and (Ben Yaghlane et al., 2000a) .
However, for the definition of the conditional non-interactivity for belief functions (see also (Ben Yaghlane, Smets, & Mellouli, 2000c )), we start from the belief on the joint product XY Z. We marginalize it on XZ and also on Y Z. We combine these two marginal belief functions and we want it to be equal to the initial one (on XY Z) combined with its marginal on Z.
This last term results from the fact that the marginals on XZ and on Y Z both contain the marginal on Z and this last is thus double counted when combining the marginals on XZ and on Y Z. This term corresponds to the pl XY (X, Y ) term encountered when defining marginal independence (see relation (6) in (Ben Yaghlane et al., 2000a) 
This definition of conditional non-interactivity (7) corresponds to Shenoy' factorization (see Shenoy (Shenoy, 1994) , lemma 3.1 (5) page 215). It can also be reformulated in terms of commonality functions as shown by Studeny (Studeny, 1993) .
Proof. Relation (8) is just a rewriting of relation (7) using the property that q 1 ∩ q 2 (A) = q 1 (A)q 2 (A) for all A in the domain of the q's, and
Links with Marginal Non-interactivity
The marginal case corresponds to the conditional case when |Z| = 1. Then definition (5.1) becomes equal to the one used in the marginal case (Definition 4 in (Ben Yaghlane et al., 2000a) ). When |Z| = 1, we have:
• w ↓Z = Z if w = ∅ and = ∅ otherwise.
• When w = ∅, q XY Z↓Z (w ↓Z ) becomes the sum of all bba's m XY given to the non empty subsets of XY , which is equal to pl XY (XY ).
Equation (8) becomes then:
for all w ⊆ XY, w = ∅. The case where w = ∅, is trivially satisfied as q(∅) = 1 for any commonality function. This relation is the definition of marginal noninteractivity. So our definition degrades nicely into the marginal case when |Z| = 1, as it should.
Conditional Non-interactivity and Marginals
It is interesting to note that Studeny (Studeny, 1993) has an objection about the definition of conditional non-interactivity 1 in the framework of DempsterShafer theory. Indeed, he notices that the definition based on equation (7) is not consistent with marginalization. It may happen that for two bba's m 1 ∈ BF XZ and m 2 ∈ BF Y Z that share the same marginal on Z (i.e., m
The next example illustrates this objection.
Example 5.1. From Studeny (personal communication)
Consider X = Y = Z = {u, v} and define the bba's over XZ and Y Z as follows:
There is no bba m over XY Z such that m XZ and m Y Z are its marginals and X and Y are conditionally non-interactive given Z with respect to m.
Its focal elements and associated bbm are: ((v,.5),(Z,.5)). In order to get non-interactivity, the bba m must satisfy
The resulting 'q' function is not a commonality function as its associated 'bba' is: ((u, u, v) , −.25). which does not correspond to a belief function as one of the 'masses' is negative. 
Proof. By CM1 (lemma 2.6) we have:
By M1 (lemma 2.5), we have:
↓Z (see (Shenoy, 1994) , page 210) and from CM1, we have:
So
Thus using relations (9), (10) and (11), we get:
(continuation)
The focal elements and related bbm for ((X, u, v) , .25), ((u, Y, v) , .25), ({(u, u, v) , (v, v, u)}, .25) . Its marginals are: 
Conditional Non-interactivity and Z-layered Rectangles
When we have treated the marginal non-interactivity between two random variables X and Y , we have proved that when X and Y are non-interactive, with respect to m XY , then the focal elements of m XY belong to Rect XY (Theorem 3 in (Ben Yaghlane et al., 2000a) ). We proceed now with the same idea applied to the conditional case and we show that the focal elements of m = m XY Z belong to the set of Z-layered rectangles (see section 2.1.3). 
Proof.
Let A be a focal element of m
Let w be a focal element of m and 
, and thus the focal elements of m belong to ZLR. ✷
Conditions for Non-interactivity
The simple fact that the focal elements belong to the set of Z-layered rectangles is not sufficient to imply conditional non-interactivity. The next example illustrates such a case.
Example 5.3. ZLR without non-interactivity. Let
5. By construction, this bba belongs to ZLR. To be non-interactive, m XY Z must satisfy (7), and in particular m
In order to get non-interactivity, we must add some proportionality constraints, like those presented in the next theorem. It must be enhanced that in the definition of non-interactivity (see theorem 5.1), the relation (8) among the commonality functions had to be true for all w in XY Z, whereas here relation (12) is required only on the w in the set of Z-layered rectangles. The theorem 5.4 is very useful as we will later show that doxastic conditional independence is equivalent to the properties of this theorem, and thus doxastic conditional independence will be proved to be equivalent to conditional non-interactivity.
Theorem 5.4 Suppose a bba m
XY Z . The next assertions are equivalent. 
The focal elements of m XY Z belong to ZLR and
∀w ∈ ZLR, q XY Z (w) q XY Z↓Z (w ↓Z ) = q XY Z↓XZ (w ↓XZ ) q XY Z↓Y Z (w ↓Y Z ) (12) Proof. 1 ⇒ 2 Let X ⊥ m XY Z Y |Z.
Conditional Irrelevance
Before presenting the definition of conditional irrelevance for belief functions, we explain the idea of two belief functions on XY Z that share the same marginals on Z after having been conjunctively combined with a given bba m defined on XY Z. The underlying idea is a problem of belief state distinguishability. Suppose two agents who hold beliefs on XY Z. Suppose You can only observe the beliefs held by these two agents on Z (thus the marginal on Z of their bba's). If these two marginal bba's are equal, You cannot distinguish between the beliefs held by the two agents, even though their beliefs on XY Z may be different. One way to distinguish the two beliefs is to present to the two agents a new piece of evidence which induces the bba m on XY Z. This last m is then combined conjunctively with the initial bba's. The marginalizations on Z can still be equal, or not, this depending on m. So one way to distinguish between belief states which can only be observed on Z is by producing various m, and comparing the marginals on Z of the combination.
For a given m on XY Z, we can consider all the belief functions on XY Z which are indistinguishable on Z. These bba's describe belief states that cannot be distinguished after having been conjunctively combined with m by only observing their marginals on Z. Thus m creates an equivalence class on the set of belief functions defined on XY Z.
Indistinguishability on Z under m
Let R Z (m) denotes the set of belief functions on XY Z that are indistinguishable on Z under m. Its formal definition is as follows:
In particular, we will use this concept of indistinguishability when m ∈ BF XY Z and m 1 , m 2 ∈ BF Y Z what is just a particular case of the definition. The reason will be that we will define conditional irrelevance as the fact that the belief on XZ is influenced by the belief on Y Z only through the impact of this last belief on Z, and not on the details on how it is distributed on Y Z. 
Any set of non negative values for the x i 's that add to 1 and such that the four sums (13), (14), (15), (16) • x 7 = m 1 (ω 3 , ω 4 , ω 5 , ω 6 ) = 1/2, x 13 = m 1 (ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 , ω 4 ) = 1/2. The focal elements of (m XY Z ∩ m 1 ) ↓Z are {ω 5 }, {ω 1 }, {ω 3 , ω 4 }{ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 , ω 4 }, each with a mass 1/4. The projection of these focal elements on Z are {ω 5 , ω 6 , ω 7 , ω 8 } with a mass 1/4 and {ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 , ω 4 } with a mass 3/4. 
Proof. By definition, assertion 1 means (
By lemma 2.7 and 2.6, each term, with i = 1, 2, can be rewritten as:
By equation (1), we have for B ⊆ Y Z,
We also have:
↓Z is equivalent to requiring:
what is equivalent to:
what proves the equivalence between assertions 1 and 2. ✷
Definition of Conditional Irrelevance
Let m ∈ BF XY Z . Suppose that we study the impact of any bba m i ∈ BF Y Z on our belief on XZ, i.e., we study (m ∩ In that case, we say that Y is conditionally irrelevant to X given Z with respect to m. Formally, we have the following definition: 
The two bba's are:
• m 1 (ω 5 , ω 6 ) = m 1 (ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 5 , ω 6 ) = 1/2, or equivalently x 3 = x 11 = 1/2.
• m 2 (ω 3 , ω 4 , ω 5 , ω 6 ) = m 2 (ω 3 , ω 4 ) = 1/2, or equivalently table 1 ). The two m 1 lines present the two focal sets of m 1 and their mass, then the focal sets that result from their combination with m XY Z (each mass is 1/4). We continue with the marginalization of these four focal sets on Z, and on XZ . The next two lines concerns m 2 . It is to be noticed that the two bba's obtained after projection on Z are equal (indistinguishability), whereas they are not on XZ (no conditional irrelevance). 
Links with Marginal Irrelevance
The definition of marginal irrelevance is given by relation (10) for ω such that:
.04 ω ⊆ {ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 , ω 4 } and |ω| = 3
.02 ω = {ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 , ω 4 } .24 
Then only four masses must be considered, denoted x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 , with for instance
For what concerns the marginalization on Z, all masses given to the non empty set are projected on {ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 , ω 4 }. Hence to get indistinguishability on Z under m XY Z , their sum must be fixed. So indistinguishability is satisfied if the masses x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 are such that:
is constant. Any pair of bba on Y Z that satisfy the constraint for a given c belongs to 
Symmetry of Conditional Irrelevance
Our definition of conditional irrelevance is symmetrical.
Theorem 6.3 IR m (X, Y |Z) iff IR m (Y, X|Z).
Proof. See appendix A. ✷
Conditioning on Z and Conditional Irrelevance
Just as in the marginal case, irrelevance is not equal to non-interactivity. We will need an extra constraint on irrelevance, the irrelevance preservation under combination IRP ∩ , in order to get the equality between these two concepts. When we prove that non-interactivity is equal to doxastic independence, i.e., irrelevance plus irrelevance preservation under combination, we will use a particular belief function, the bba characterizing a conditioning on z 0 ⊆ Z, that satisfies the irrelevance conditions.
Theorem 6.4 If m(z
↑XY Z 0 ) = 1 for z 0 ⊆ Z, then IR m (X, Y |Z).
Proof. See appendix A ✷
Conditional Doxastic Independence
In the probabilistic framework, it can be easily proved that independence and irrelevance concepts are equivalent. However, in the belief functions framework, the situation is not as simple, irrelevance alone does not imply independence.
In the marginal case (Ben Yaghlane et al., 2000a), we have defined that two variables are doxastically independent when they are irrelevant and this irrelevance is preserved under Dempster's rule of combination. Then we prove that irrelevance and doxastic independence are equivalent.
In this section, we show that the notion of doxastic independence 2 defined in the marginal case can be extended to the conditional case. We discuss also the relationship between conditional doxastic independence and Z-layered rectangles. Finally, we state two theorems establishing the equivalence between conditional doxastic independence and conditional non-interactivity.
Irrelevance Preservation under Conjunctive Combination
Just as in the marginal case, we feel that conditional doxastic independence requires not only the conditional irrelevance property, but that property should be preserved when combining two belief functions that satisfy it. The idea fits with the next scenario: if two agents claims that X and Y are conditionally doxastically independent given Z, then this conditional independence should be preserved when the belief functions representing the agents' beliefs are conjunctively combined. So conditional doxastic independence is irrelevance plus irrelevance preservation under conjunctive combination, denoted IRP ∩ . Formally, the last property is defined as follows: Definition 7.1 Irrelevance preservation under conjunctive combination. Given m 1 , m 2 ∈ BF XY Z , we say they satisfy
Definition of Conditional Doxastic Independence
The notion of doxastic independence defined in the marginal case can be extended to the conditional case by the following definition. 
Conditional Doxastic Independence and Z-layered Rectangles
Conditional Doxastic Independence equals Conditional
Non-Interactivity
Proof. Both requirements of theorem 5.4 are satisfied: the ZLR requirement is proved in theorem 7.1 and the commonality requirement is proved in theorem 10.11 in appendix A. ✷
Proof. We first prove that X ⊥ m Y |Z implies IR m (X, Y |Z). For that, we use the removal operator of Shenoy (Shenoy, 1994) 
Then using lemma 2.6, we get:
Using equation (20), we get thus:
We must now prove that X ⊥ m Y |Z implies that irrelevance preservation under ∩ . By Lemma 3.1 of (Shenoy, 1994) , property 2, we have:
It can equaly be written with g ∈ BF XZ , h ∈ BF Y Z , k ∈ BF Z as:
as shown in the first part of this proof. ✷
Axiomatic Characterization
As we said before, reasoning systems should take into account conditional independence considerations in order to get an efficient performance. Conditional independence is given with the conditional independence relations (Dawid, 1979) , (Pearl, 1988) , which successfully depict our intuition about how dependencies should update in response to new pieces of information.
In this section, we first introduce the conditional independence relations in an abstract way (section 8.1). We emphasize, essentially, on the intuitive meaning of these relations. After this, we present the characterization of conditional independence definition for belief functions (section 8.2).
Conditional Independence Relations
The concept of conditional independence has been well studied in probability theory (see, for instance, (Dawid, 1979) (Dawid, 1999) , (Pearl, 1988) ,...). This study of probabilistic conditional independence has resulted in the identification of several properties that should be satisfied by any relationship which attempts to capture the intuitive notion of independence.
Recently, several researchers propose to treat conditional independence (CI) without any connection to probability theory. For this purpose, CI is presented as an abstract concept (Dawid, 1999) . This approach leads to a well understanding of the CI properties, and then facilitates efficient computations in reasoning systems. In this context, the intuitive meaning of the (abstract) conditional independence is given in terms of irrelevance. Suppose three (sets of) random variables X, Y , and Z. When we say that X is conditionally independent to Y given Z (written X ⊥ ⊥ Y |Z), we mean that once the value of Z has been specified, any further information about Y is irrelevant to uncertainty about X. In order to capture the main properties of this abstract notion, some axioms are proposed (Pearl, 1988) , (Dawid, 1999) :
This relation asserts that in any state of knowledge Z, if Y tells us nothing new about X, then X tells us nothing new about Y.
• A2: Decomposition :
This relation asserts that if (Y and W) are irrelevant to X then Y (resp. W) is irrelevant to X.
• A3: Weak union :
This relation states that the learning of an irrelevant information W, can't transform an irrelevant information Y into a pertinent one to X.
• A4:
This relation asserts that if W is irrelevant to X after learning some irrelevant information Y, then W was also irrelevant to X knowing Y. The weak union and this property state, together, that irrelevant information should not modify the relevance of other propositions.
• A5:
This relation states that if Y is irrelevant to X when W is known and W is irrelevant to X when Y is known, then neither W, nor Y, nor their combination is relevant to X.
A dependency model is called semi-graphoid if it verify the axioms A1-A4, and graphoid if it satisfy the axioms A1-A5. It is well known (see e.g. (Pearl, 1988) ) that probabilistic independence relation is a semi-graphoid, and it is a graphoid if the probability is strictly positive (in this case A5 is satisfied).
Belief Function Conditional Independence Relations
The properties of conditional independence can be considered as a rules' set useful to infer new independence relations from an initial set. They are also important when we need a graphical representation of dependencies.
When studying the concept of conditional independence in valuation-based systems (VBS 3 ), Shenoy have proved that the conditional independence concept satisfies the graphoid axioms (Shenoy, 1994) .
As the theory of belief functions is one particular uncertainty theory of the VBS framework, we proceed similarly and we provide in the theorem 8.1 the conditional independence properties for belief functions that also satisfy graphoid axioms. For this purpose, we use the definition of conditional noninteractivity.
Theorem 8.1 Let X, Y, Z and W be disjoint subsets of a set of variables U, and a mass m over the product space. The following properties are satisfied:
The corresponding proofs showing the validity of these properties for any belief function are given in appendix B.
Conclusion
Like for other uncertainty formalisms, the concept of conditional independence is also important in belief functions theory. After the first part of this study (Ben Yaghlane et al., 2000c ) in which we have studied the marginal belief function independence, we proceed similarly and we propose, in this paper, an extension of the marginal case to the conditional case. For this purpose, we present the definitions of:
• Conditional non-interactivity: the joint belief function can be rebuilt from its marginals.
• Conditional irrelevance: the belief on XZ depends on any belief over Y Z only through the impact of the last belief function on Z.
• Conditional irrelevance preservation under conjunctive combination rule: if two belief functions satisfy conditional irrelevance, then their conjunctive combination satisfies also conditional irrelevance.
• Conditional doxastic independence: defined as conditional irrelevance that is preserved under conjunctive combination rule.
The major result is that conditional non-interactivity and conditional doxastic independence are equivalent. Furthermore, we show that belief function conditional non-interactivity satisfy the graphoid axioms.
In future work, we will investigate:
• the existence and the properties of conditional products (Dawid & Studeny, 1999) for belief function theory,
• the links between our concept of conditional doxastic independence and the concept of separoid recently introduced by Dawid (Dawid, 2000) ,
• the impact of conditional doxastic independence with respect to its graphical representation and the propagation of information in this structure.
Appendix A : Matricial Representations and Proofs
Relation between q and pl
The next relation holds between plausibility functions and commonality functions.
Lemma 10.1
Solution by Continuity for Dogmatic Belief Functions
A dogmatic belief function is defined as a belief function with m(Ω) = 0 (Smets, 1995) . Many theorems are easy to prove for non dogmatic belief functions. A method to solve the dogmatic case consists in studying a solution when m(Ω) = , and then taking its limits when → 0. This is satisfactory if we accept that belief functions satisfy the continuity assumptions. This axiom simplifies the solution of rank problems in section 10.8. It could be avoided but proofs would be more complex.
Matricial Notations
In order to simplify the proofs, we use the following matricial notations.
• For m i ∈ BF Y Z , m i is the 2 |Y Z| column vector with components
• For m ∈ BF XY Z , P is the 2 |XZ| × 2 |Y Z| matrix with components
The columns of H X are the columns of P where B = z ↑XZ .
The columns of H Y are the lines of P where A = z ↑Y Z .
• Let N X be the 2 |XZ| ×2 |XZ| matrix with components n X (A,
• Let N Y be the 2
• For m ∈ BF XY Z , Q X is the 2 |XZ| × 2 |Z| matrix with components
We have:
Proof. We have to prove that for A ⊆ XZ:
what is true by lemma 10.1. ✷
Proof. The proof proceeds as for lemma 10. 
Indistinguishability
We rewrite theorem 6.1 in matricial notation.
Theorem 10.1 Let m ∈ BF XY Z , and m 1 , m 2 ∈ BF Y Z . The following assertions are equivalent.
Proof. This theorem is just a rewriting of relation (17) Proof. There as 2 |Z| possible values for z but the column of H Y corresponding to z = ∅ is made of 0's, so the rank can never be larger than 2 |Z| − 1. ✷
Irrelevance in Matricial Notation
we have:
↓XZ can be written in term of its plausibility functions. For A ⊆ XZ, 
Proof. This property is just a rephrasing of the initial definition, using the properties derived in theorem 10.2. ✷ We prove theorem 6.2 that shows that conditional irrelevance degrades into marginal irrelevance when |Z| = 1.
Theorem 10.4 If
When |Z| = 1, A can be written as x, B as y, and the constraints become:
Hence pl [y] ↓X ∝ pl ↓X , and IR m (X, Y ) holds. ✷
Symmetry of Conditional Irrelevance
In order to prove the symmetry of irrelevance, we first prove the following properties. 
Conditioning on Z and irrelevance.
We prove the technical theorem 6.4, about a particular belief function.
Theorem 10.8 If m(z
Proof. We keep the notation convention that
= ∅, and = 0 otherwise.
We proceed with the P = [p(A, B)] matrix, where
, and = 0 otherwise. We have:
¿From (24) we have 
Proof. We keep the notation convention that A ⊆ XZ, B ⊆ Y Z and z ⊆ Z.
a) Let
We know that m's focal elements belong to ZLR (as m satisfies IR m (X, Y |Z)), hence they can be represented as ∪ zi∈Z (x i , y i , z i ). 
Given C, and with
with E ⊆ A, F ⊆ B, and at least one of E = A or F = B holds.
We have 
, and we consider the sets obtained while letting ( 
We show that r(A, B) = 0 whenever A ↓Z = B ↓Z . We had:
Suppose the subsets A of XZ and B of Y Z are identically ordered in the matrix R according to the values of their projection on Z. It means we start with ∅, and put successively the subsets A of XZ which projection on Z is z 1 , is z 2 , is {z 1 , z 2 }, is z 3 , . . . is Z, and similarly with the subsets of Y Z. Theorem 10.9 shows that R is then made of 2 |Z| − 1 non zero blocks located along its 'diagonal'. As N X and N Y are non-singular, P and R have equal ranks. Therefore the basis of R is built by selecting in each block one line and one column. The choice is arbitrary, but the best choice consists in using the lines that correspond to those subsets of XZ which are equal to z ↑XZ for z ⊆ Z (and the same for the columns). The resulting matrix are denoted Q X and Q Y , respectively, as shown hereafter (see lemma 10.2 and 10.3).
Theorem 10.10 Let
Proof.
1. Let Q = [q(z 1 , z 2 )] be the 2 |Z| ×2 |Z| matrix with q(z 1 , z 2 ) = 1 if z 1 ⊆ z 2 , and = 0 otherwise. Note that Q is the matrix that transforms a bba into a credibility function. So Q −1 is well defined, and its component q(z 1 , z 2 ) = (−1) |z2|−|z1| if z 1 ⊆ z 2 , and = 0 otherwise. By construction, Q X = D X Q and Q Y = D Y Q.
2. We prove first that there exists a diagonal matrix F such that:
Based on the theory of generalized inverse, we know that the 2 |XZ| × 2 |Y Z| matrix P of rank r can be represented as P = P X L P Y where
• P X is a 2 |XZ| × r matrix of rank r,
• L is a r × r diagonal matrix of rank r,
• and P Y P X = I, the r × r identity matrix.
We know also that rank(H X ) = rank(H Y ) = r. So there exists a T X and a T Y so that P X = H X T X and P Y = H Y T Y So P can also be represented as
where D X and D Y are defined in the theorem and Suppose that q is not dogmatic (i.e., q(X, Y, Z) > 0). Then the two q terms are positive, and thus f (z A , z B ) = 0. If q is dogmatic, we just change q so that q(X, Y, Z) = , and we find then that f (z A , z B ) = 0. This is true for every , and by the continuity assumed in axiom 10.1, we can deduce that even for the dogmatic case, f (z A , z B ) = 0 is required.
Thus f (z 1 , z 2 ) = 0 whenever z 1 = z 2 , what means that F is a diagonal matrix. Therefore replacing D by Q −1 F Q −1 in (27) we get
where F is diagonal. Hence (26) is proved.
4.
We prove that the diagonal elements of F are (−1) |z|+1 /q ↓Z (z) when the denominator is non null, and = 0 otherwise.
The rows of H X can be permuted so that the rows which index is a cylindrical extension of a subset of Z are at the top. Then H X = A B X where the
. So A is symmetrical. The same operation can be done on H Y , and the upper block is in fact the same A as in the decomposition of H X . Applying the same permutation on P, we find that its upper left corner is also the A matrix.
So we get |z|+1 /q ↓Z (z) when denominator is non null, and = 0 otherwise (anything would be satisfactory, and we choose for simplicity sake). ✷
The next theorem shows that the second requirement requested by theorem 5.4 is satisfied. Hence the theorem is proved. ✷
Appendix B : Proofs of Graphoid Axioms for Belief Function Conditional Independence
The following properties corresponding to the theorem 8.1 prove the validity of the graphoid axioms for any belief function. In all proofs, we use the definition of conditional non-interactivity and we omit to indicate the domain XY Z. Combining m ↓W with both sides of the preceding equality, we get : 
We have also
Since we have the same left-hand sides of the preceding two equalities (30) and (31), the right-hands must be equal, so we obtain :
When we combine m ↓Y ∩ m ↓W with both sides of the preceding equality, we get :
We marginalize (32) on Y, we obtain then :
By equation (30), we have already proved that
